The Dilemmas of Multilateral Interventions in Conflicts

By: Musue Haddad

Have you listened to local and international news recently? Have you read local and international news? Have you watched national and international television news? If so, then you will begin to feel that people are fighting and fighting, and all around the world, nations are fighting. You will also notice that in the midst of these conflicts, there are mediators, trying to intercede, or act as referees, or intervene in the conflicts. Do you need some solid examples of countries engulfed in crises? Take a look at the Libyan factional fighting, the ongoing crises in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Also, let's expand our view to the conflicts in Sudan, the Yemeni and Syrian uprising, the Kosovo-Serbia border clashes, the Bahraini uprising, and the ongoing insurgency in northern Mali.

As we mull over the various conflicts that have occurred in our societies, including the ongoing conflicts, we will note that the presence of various national and international mediators, and or multilateral interventions, whose presence we are told is to "cease hostilities" and resolve the conflicts. The next question then becomes, how successful has the process of mediations been? How do we measure the accomplishment of multilateral groups in conflicts? In order to discuss these concerns, let's take a look at the Liberian conflict, particularly the negotiation process that resulted in the 1997 Special Elections. I did not participate in the negotiation process but the result of that process has left me wondering how regional and international politics and the self interests of states can have a devastating effect on multilateral interventions.

As we see around us, it is the practice that when conflicts arise in a country, states negotiate multilaterally. Ambassadors, ministers and leaders of various groups are called to serve as mediators to help the parties involved in the conflict overcome their impasses. This was the situation of the negotiation process that resulted in the 1997 elections in Liberia, and the subsequent "elections" of ex-rebel leader, Charles Taylor as president. While it is true that multilateral interventions in state conflicts are essential, there are some key elements that are generally overlooked. During multilateral negotiation process, little is known about how the role of each of these mediators will be played. Two issues that remain obscured, but critical are the options and interests of mediators and the standards that will be used in the negotiation process. Standards have to do what can be done to cease hostility. In the case of Liberia, the standards deduced from the process included 1. Stop the fighting in Liberia in order for the establishment of political parties and elections to be held. 2. Disarmament needed to carry out to encourage and ensure free and fair elections. 3. A transitional government where each party was appointed as vice presidents while a neutral person serves as chair person of the transitional government.

As we consider the interests of mediators, let's begin to think about the individual and or collective interests of mediators, what consequences those interests have on the outcome of the negotiations? These questions are generally given little considerations during multilateral negotiation process in states conflicts. Therefore, in an attempt to expound on the two obscured, but critical issues, we will attempt to analyze efforts by the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS), other world leaders and regional and international organizations intervention on the Liberia crisis. The analysis looks at the mode of the negotiation process using the Nine-Element framework, Circle Chart design of the meeting to analyze the mediators "resolution" of the Liberian conflict and Charles Taylor's election to the presidency.

I will also explore whether the commitments reached were operational and durable and if the outcome of that negotiation was the best alternative to the negotiated agreement.

THE PROBLEM AND SYMPTOMS

Understanding the Liberian conflict is important for the negotiation process. In order for mediators to recognize whether there will be impediments to the negotiation process and how options can be generated and what specifics steps they need to take, they need to have adequate information of the prevailing problems. Without understanding some of the concealed problems, mediators will fail in achieving two of the most influencing elements of the negotiation process: Communications and Relationship. The two influencing elements - Communication and Relationship, help a mediator to keep the negotiation process on course without reaching a deadlock and determine whether relationship between the parties is possible or already exist. If the parties lack relationship, the mediator can find out whether it is possible to influence or initiate one.

The civil war in Liberia started in December 1989. At that time, I was a student at the University of Liberia and partly active in Student politics. Student politics at the University then was not isolated to campus issues, but included and focused mostly on national issues. Samuel K. Doe was president of Liberia then. Throughout the over 150 years of the existence of Liberia, after Liberia was established, Doe was the first native to become president of that country. Aside Doe, Liberian presidents were all former American slaves or descendants of Slaves. I believe understanding the trend of Liberian presidency is important for understanding the root causes of the Liberian war, the opened or hidden relationship that exist between and among parties and how to negotiate on the alternatives and interests of parties involved.

President Doe came to power through a military coup. He was a Master Sergeant who led a group of young soldiers that toppled the government of William R. Tolbert. At the time of the coup in 1980, I was still in elementary school but I felt and witnessed the brunt of the coup as the military searched for members of Tolbert's government officials, friends and sympathizers of that administration. [Let me clarify that by outlining my own experience, I am attempting to provide (my own first) first hand information that had a great bearing on the war and conflicts in Liberia.] The military soldiers committed crimes against civilians not only in the capital, Monrovia but in the remote parts of rural Liberia. As a little girl in Salayea, (then a town now a District) the soldiers came to my parents' home in combat form, carrying long ranged weapons. They asked all of us to line up as they searched and ransacked our home, under the pretext of searching for members of Tolbert's family and government officials. Later, after the 'soldiers" chaos in Salayea subsided; I learnt that the soldiers raped, looted, and killed innocent civilians. These violations were carried out with impunity. These crimes committed by the soldiers and those who were anti Tolbert agents were apparently never forgotten. This background information is important for the analysis of the mediatory roles carried out and also to have an in depth understanding of the aftermath of the peace process and the results of the elections. These events were brought forth and it became obvious that each party to the conflict held on to some aspects of the historical background as a hidden motive.

During the administration of Charles Taylor, it was evident that there were acts of reprisal carried for members of the former slaves that suffered abuses during the administration of Doe. This information is obviously something that parties did bring forth during peace talks and might have resulted in ineffective communications with parties resisting compromise and continuously Contesting of Wills, positions, and being hard bargainers.

CIRCLE CHART: Problem & Symptoms

In December 1989 a group of dissidents began an uprising against the government of President Doe. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the rebel group led by Charles Taylor invaded Liberia and within weeks controlled much of the countryside. Charles Taylor is a descendant of former American slaves. He did not hold back his intentions. Taylor once announced that he was revenging the killings members of Tolbert's government that was carried out by Doe. At the University of Liberia, students were rejoicing that a group had taken a bold stance against the leadership of Doe; an indication that Doe has lost favor with the Liberian population. The NPFL splinter group, Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia only increased the violence as fighting continued into 1990. As the fighting increased, Doe became more forceful and members of the military began arresting citizens accusing them of being supporters and fans of the rebels. Student of the University were also victims and we hid our University of Liberia students' identification cards. Some student were deliberately targeted, arrested and killed. As the fighting intensified, barbaric human rights violations became frequent and wide spread by all groups.

ACTION STEPS

An Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) monitoring group (ECOMOG) was sent to Liberia as a peacekeeping force, but failed to halt the fighting. Doe was captured and executed by the splinter group of the NPFL in September 1990. Members of the military and Doe's ethnic tribe and other independent groups accused ECOMOG. They said ECOMOG had set up the capture and killing of Doe. Doe was at ECOMOG's headquarter when he was capture by the INPFL. During the capture of Doe, I had already fled the country. I was among the 3.3 million Liberia who was driven from their homes. Having fled first to Sierra Leone, I had then moved to Guinea as a refugee when Doe was captured, and subsequently killed.

The killing of Doe did not end the war. The war spread through out Liberia, as the NPFL battled ECOMOG, the Liberian army, their splinter group the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), composed of former allies of Doe. All the factional groups were engaging in fighting with one group or another. By early 1991, ECOMOG held Monrovia and the NPFL controlled the rest of the country. In October 1991 ECOWAS and the NPFL agreed to disarm and establish an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). I had returned home in the midst of the crisis hoping that the presence of ECOMOG was a signal of security. However, I fled again this time to Ghana. I was present and attended the Ghana peace conference in July 1993. At that conference, the leaders of IGNU, NPFL, and ULIMO-K drew up a plan for a Liberian National Transitional Government, led by a five-member Council of State consisting of one NPFL leader, one ULIMO-K member, one IGNU representative, and two other civilians.

INTERESTS & NEGOTIATION CONCEPTS

It was public knowledge that the warlords and factional groups saw the economics opportunities provided by the civil war as an important independent variable for continuing the conflict. This economic interest of the parties influenced three Core Elements of the negotiation process: Interests, Options and Standards, which was overlooked by the mediators. The economic interests of the parties also had an effect and also manipulated the two influencing elements of The Nine-Element framework of negotiation-Communications and Relationships. Most of the parties who occupied areas that would enable them to amass wealth and power became hard bargainers and Contesting Positions and Wills. The parties bargaining positions, interest, options and options continually changed based on how much grounds they controlled. Given the dynamics of the situations, I had expected that the mediators would amend the discussion process as the positions of parties changed.

During the negotiations, it was also realized that factional groups interest in controlling certain areas in Liberia were based mostly on economic interests and then for military capability. For examples, the NPFL was keen on maintaining control of the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. The purpose was to use Sierra Leone as a fall back position whenever that group experienced a stronger attack. Another interest in holding on to the route of Sierra Leone was to maintain contact with the rebel Revolutionary United Front, (RUF) of Sierra Leone. It is alleged that Charles Taylor assisted in the establishment of the RUF, and supported the training of that rebel group. Another area that the NPFL was determined to maintain control of was the route to Ivory Coast. Ivory Coast was important to Charles Taylor because that route was used to convey resources out of his territory to be sold to interested buyers. Ivory Coast was also important for the importation of arms and ammunition for his fighting group. Another area that was strategic to the NPFL was Grand Bassa County, which has a small port. The NPFL allegedly used the port to export iron ore, log and rubber out of Liberia.

Parties in the Liberia conflict were seen using various approaches based on interest during the negotiation process. As a result of the interest based of parties, they individually extended and expanded their relationships to their neighbors; countries in the region. In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, diverse factions sabotaged efforts towards a transition from war to peace as they perceived such endeavors as representing a shift of their own political and military calculations and a readjustment of economic tactics and interests that were not temporarily in their favor. Mediators in the Liberian conflicts did little to assure that the full range of issues and interests of parties were addressed. It is obvious that the mediators were aware and concerned about the factional groups' immense interest in the economic opportunities provided by the civil wars. The parties' interests in economic gains of the war did have implications on the negotiation process and on the relationships of countries in the sub region.

Though at that time of the 1993 peace conference, I had not acquired the basic negotiation skills needed to analysis a situation, it was public knowledge that each party to the Liberian conflict were contesting positions. Neither one of the parties was willing to compromise their stance. I also realized that the roles and interests of most of the mediators were not clear. It is now evident that the two context setting elements of negotiation are very crucial: WHO'S AT THE Table, is very important in a negotiation process. During the Liberian war, several peace agreements were signed and promptly broken by warring factions as their interests and options changed. After months of negotiation, late 1996, parties in the Liberian conflict agreed to a ceasefire in order for disarmament and elections to be held.

EXIT ELEMENTS & THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROCESS

When the mediators and international groups declared the Liberian disarmament program a success in January 1997, civilian and independent groups' concern about the role of the mediators and outside actors in Liberian were no longer unknown. Majority of the mediators and outside actors either did not have an in-depth understanding of the Liberian situation, or had their own interests. In 1997, I personally witnessed and reported on the elections. Almost all factional groups formed political parties. Examples: the National Patriotic Front of Liberia formed the National Patriotic Party and United Liberation Movement of Liberia splinter group of Alhaji Kromah formed the All Liberia Coalition Party and presidential candidates respectively.

Most areas that were once controlled by factional groups during the fighting were not fully accessible to other political groups except the political wing of that factional group that once controlled those areas. Even though ECOMOG, the mediators and international monitors had announced that disarmament was completely carried out, fighters/ex-fighters of all factional groups were apparently in possession of weapons. It was alleged that former fighters still carried arms which they used to intimidate, harassed and attack civilians, members of other political parties and other politicians who dare enter their "territory." As a result of the intimidation and attacks on civilians, voters were afraid. Under the watchful eyes of combatants who guided voters to the voting booths, most of the citizens residing and caught up in the over 90 percent of the country controlled by Charles Taylor were apprehensive.

In addition to the intimidation faced by voters and citizens, the role of some ECOWAS countries became questionable. For example, an official of one ECOWAS contributing country was seen escorting Charles Taylor to cast his vote on the day of elections. Aside Charles Taylor, none of the other 12 presidential candidates was escorted by any diplomats or officials from other countries represented in ECOMOG or ECOWAS to cast their vote. The act by an official of one of the contributing countries to ECOWAS, one of the mediators was seen as a public endorsement of Charles Taylor as their choice of presidential candidate. I saw, photographed and published the photos and reports of Charles Taylor being escorted on that day to cast his vote. I also traveled to some part of the rural areas along with a team of journalists from my office. We reported the level of intimation and flaws in the elections. Through interviews and witnessing the polls, we wrote extensively on the malpractices carried out at polling sites in the presence of local and international election observers.

The role of ECOMOG and ECOWAS States in the Liberian conflict brought forth how crucial mapping relationship and design of meeting is to a negotiation process. To analyze the crucial-ity of relationship and interest, let's ask ourselves a few questions: What did the facilitators want to accomplish at the end of the process? What outcomes would have ensured security and that sustainable peace is restore? Well, these are key question that should have been considered during the Liberian peace process. In spite outcries by citizens, political parties and independent monitors, International observers and ECOWAS declared the elections free and fair. Charles Taylor was declared winner of the 1997 elections and installed president in August 1997.

COMMITMENTS

During Taylor's administration, Liberia and West Africa experienced consistent insecurity and crises. Sierra Leone experienced a devastating war organized and supported by Charles Taylor. Guinea suffered constant invasion and Ivory Coast is still faced with crises. Human Rights violations in Liberia became systematic and frequent during the administration of Charles Taylor. Liberia's infrastructure remained in a deplorable state throughout the administration of Charles Taylor. Hospitals and basic social services were never rehabilitated. The level of illiteracy rose to 85% and unemployment reached a peak of 80%.

THE [NINE] ELEMENTS

Although the parties to the negotiation were listed above, to ensure that the analysis is less complicated, we will be dealing with few major parties. This analysis will indicate how communications and relationship between the parties were phony when seen as good on the surface and at other times non existent. This was based on the issue of ego and portrayal of power; not wanting to be seen as ready to compromise with the other party. Though attempts were made by the mediators to discuss concerns behind the scene, there were some senses of reluctance based on ensuring that the warlords do not angrily leave the discussion table and return back to the fighting field. Obviously this fear was belated. There were instances where factional leaders were at the table discussing peace and would give orders and their forces would begin renewed fighting. This practice was a strategy used to intimidate other parties at the negotiation table.

COMMUNICATIONS

Throughout the period of the war, the negotiation process and the exit period of the negotiation, communications and relationship among the parties was ineffective because of lack of trust and fear. Each party felt superior to the other. These parties had threatened the lives of one another and even tried to carry out those attempts throughout the period of fighting, and so found it difficult to trust one another. Building trust was almost impossible.

BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)

Parties in negotiation can easily walk away from the negotiation if they determined that their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA is better than the likely outcome of that negotiation. In the case of the Liberian negotiation process, it is easy to deduce that most of the parties involved in this negotiation process aside ECOMOG could easily have walked away from the negotiation table if they felt their desire to emerge winners were not a part of the outcome of the negotiation process.

It is also impossible to establish the BATNAs of the mediators. I am aware that the mediators were concerned about regional stability and peace. The spill over effects of the Liberia crisis into Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Ivory Coast was causing undue hardship on all countries within the region. The influx of refugees was heightening the already difficult economic situations countries in the region were faced with. It is important to note that BATNAs in the Liberia negotiation process could be described as having two stages. The major parties came in with a BATNA: they would fight and continue fighting unless they had a better deal. The parties came in aware of what they could control or influence before the negotiation begins. However, once the negotiation process had begun, they began to have more power base. BATNA as a dynamic element, begun to change during the Liberian negotiation as parties got more information about the interests of the other parties and their constituencies and as they compared the resources each party had available to bring about and fulfill an agreement.

CONCLUSION

The analyses is an exercise that provides an in-depth understanding on the process of negotiation, BATNAs and particularly the role of negotiators as outlined in the book, "Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving." As I look back over the entire peace process, the questions that continue to linger in my mind is the role of the mediators and what was the driving force for the negotiation process and concepts use in the course of the Liberian peace process?

As I have learned, during multiparty negotiation process, mediators must always think about the Substance and about the Negotiation Process. It is now understandable why the two: substance and process are critical for constant review during multiparty negotiations. The reason is that, when one or more of the nine-element framework changes, the process or substance may need to be modified to ensure that the outcome of the negotiation is successful. That is because, once the process of a negotiation is efficient, there is a likelihood of efficient communication. This was the problem in the Liberian negotiation. The substance was always changing yet the process somehow did not match the changes that were taking places. The mediators probably did not have the tools to move briskly in modifying the process, or probably were trapped by the challenges they faced during negotiations.

While drafting this analysis, I began to fully acknowledge the assumptions that most interventionists hold as was the case with ECOMOG and ECOWAS. The West African mediator was acting in defense of "democracy" and they believed that "democratic elections" after war was the best solution to the Liberian crises. This assumption is clearly misleading as we saw in Liberia. Democracy is not merely elections. Moreover, multilateral mediators should begin to see the danger of rebel movements transforming themselves into political parties after post conflict. This practice should be taken more seriously especially when it entails protection and impunity for warlords who have committed crimes against humanity. From the onset of the outcome of the Liberian negotiation, I doubted that elections were the solution to political stability. It is impossible to have a free and fair election in the midst of intimidations as was seen in Liberia. Moreover, the fear factor still prevailed and people were still war weary and impoverished. What were the motives of the mediators in calling for the holding of elections that time? As I look back, it was obvious that the election was an immediate pacification of the warlords with jobs and elective offices. Regional instability, regional insecurity, underdevelopment as well as national instability did not cease but continued and intensified after "elections" was conducted in Liberia.

Somehow, it appears as a mockery that in spite the irregularities at the polls, the United Nations and other international organizations described the Liberian elections as a success story for conflict management. It was apparent that the interventionist only managed to establish a government in Liberia for the purpose of Order and not justice. I believe that all the warlords in the Liberian crisis should not have been allowed to contest the elections. The human rights abuses perpetrated by the various factions in the Liberian conflict were carried out with impunity. It is a known fact that there can be no lasting Order in a society without Justice. Lasting order and Justice are linked, in order to have a lasting order, there must be justice.

Although I do not believe that the outcome of the Liberian negotiation was a success, I was tempted to place myself in the reverse position taking the role of the mediators while scrutinizing each of the steps and elements in the negotiation process. In that role, I asked myself, "What were the alternatives and options available to the mediators during the Liberian negotiation process?" Perhaps some day when I am faced with such situation, I can help ensure that the outcome of the negotiation is one that is operational and durable.

About the author:

Musue N. Haddad is a Liberian Journalist/Photo-Journalist. She holds a graduate degree from George Washington University, and has worked both at home and outside of Liberia. She received several national and international awards for her journalistic practices and human rights work, including the Nelson Mandela Award for "Best Student in Photo-Journalism," Human Rights Award from the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area (UNA-NCA), for "outstanding dedication and service towards the recognition, promotion and protection of the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family." and Human Rights Watch Hellmann-Hammett Award, granted to writers around the world who have been the targets of political persecution. In 1998/1999, she received the Press Union of Liberia "Journalist of the Year" and '"Photo-Journalist of the Year" awards.